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Abstract. 
In our study we investigate the association between inter-organizational trust and access to 
financing for 11,500 firms across transitional countries (including Turkey). The results of our 
study contribute to the stream of economic development literature in two primary ways. First, 
we show that the degree of prepayment demanded by private sector firms from their customers 
tends to be a good measure of (dis)trust in business transactions. In transitional countries, 
whether or not a private firm demands prepayment for its sales is found to be a strong indicator 
of (dis)trust for its customers and/or a lack of confidence in the contract enforcement at the 
country level. Second, and most importantly, our econometric analyses suggest that enterprises 
in countries with high levels of inter-firm trust are more likely to obtain bank loans and less 
likely to report access to financing as a major obstacle to their businesses. This result remains 
robust with the inclusion of many controls and various specification checks as well as 
econometric adjustments for the potential endogeneity of trust and access to financing.  
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1. Introduction 
Research regarding the potential link between institutions and economic performance has 
become widespread since the publication of Acemoglu et al.’s (2001) seminal paper. 
Consequently, in recent years, theme related to the developmental impact of social capital, the 
natural complement of institutions, has also become increasingly popular in the economic 
literature. This popularity has further been promoted by influential papers written by Robert 
Putnam (1993) and Francis Fukuyama (1995). Robert Putnam (1993), for example, documented 
a strong positive relationship between the degree of individuals’ free association with one 
another and economic performance in Italy. Since Francis Fukuyama (1995) also showed the 
strong effect of social capital on economic development, a large body of empirical literature has 
emerged to verify the benefits that social capital has on economic outcomes (Helliwell and 
Putnam 1995, Knack and Keefer 1997, Knack and Zack 2001). Helliwell and Putnam (1995) noted 
that, when holding income constant, regions of Italy with high levels of social capital grew faster 
than did regions without high levels of social capital. Knack and Keefer (1997) showed that 
higher levels of trust were more conducive to growth in a sample of 29 market economies, while 
Knack and Paul Zack (2001) found this relationship to be persistent even after controlling for the 
quality of law enforcement.  
Social capital is generally interpreted as the degree of trust, co-operative norms and networks 
and associations within a society and therefore, trust and social capital are usually used 
interchangeably in the literature (Putnam et al. 1993, Knack and Keefer 1997, La Porta et al. 
1997, Knack and Zak 2001, Bowles and Ginits 2002).  In addition to its direct effect on economic 
performance, various arguments have been put forward regarding the ways in which trust can 
be associated with economic phenomena through indirect mechanisms (Knack 2002, Durlauf 
and Fafchamps 2004). For example, La Porta et al. (1997) found trust to be correlated with 
measures of education and health, while Bjornskov (2012) showed that trust affects both 
schooling and Rule of Law. Positive associations between trust and international trade have 
been investigated by Butter and Mosch (2003), while Rose-Ackerman (2001) and Ahlerup et al. 
(2009) documented some interchangeability between social capital and formal institutions.     
 
Although it has barely been studied in the literature, the role of trust on financial development 
is also recognized as one of the important mechanisms through which trust can affect economic 
development. Despite the theoretically straightforward association between financial 
development and trust, there are only two fundamental studies that have investigated this link 
empirically. First, in a cross-country analysis, Calderon et al. (2002) have empirically tested the 
relationship between trust and different variables of financial development. Their study 
concludes that social trust is strongly associated with financial development and efficiency 
indicators. A second study has been conducted by Guiso et al. (2004) where they empirically 
tested the relationship between social capital and different measures of financial development 
in Italy. The authors suggest that households are more likely to use checks, invest in stocks, have 
access to credit lines and use less informal credit in the areas of Italy where social capital is high. 
To our knowledge, these are the only two papers that have empirically analyzed the role of 
social trust in financial development.  
 
Unlike these two studies that investigate social trust and financial access in the context of a 
developed country, this study attempts to analyze the relationship between the two concepts in 
the context of transitional countries. Lack of financial access is a much more serious problem in 
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transitional countries, and it is hoped that our study can suggest some ways in which firms in 
transitional countries could have their access to external financing enhanced. In general, the 
main objective of our study is to estimate the role of trust in promoting financial access among 
firms in transitional countries. With this purpose in mind, our paper complements and extends 
the ongoing discussion in following three ways. 
 
First, and perhaps most importantly, this is the first study which specifically focuses on the 
relationship between trust and financial access among firms in transitional countries. Following 
the trust measure suggested by Raiser et al. (2008), we are the first to empirically test the 
association between inter-firm trust and two different measures of financial access. One of 
these measures is absolute, and the other is perceptional. Second, the dataset employed in our 
study is more comprehensive than are datasets used in the previous studies. Unlike previous 
works that inferred trust and financial access measures from aggregated and household-level 
sources, we measure both indicators directly from nationally representative firm-level datasets 
from 29 transitional countries as well as Turkey. Furthermore, we combine the micro-data with 
a diverse set of aggregated macroeconomic indicators in order to reflect the general level of 
economic, financial and institutional development in the countries. Third, we employ two 
simultaneous equation specifications with instrumental variables to isolate reverse causality 
between trust and financial development. In this way, we are able to establish and quantify 
causal effect of trust on the financial access of firms. 
 
Our results suggest that trust among businesses is strongly associated with the financial 
outreach of firms. The higher the inter-firm trust in a country, the higher a firm’s probability of 
obtaining credit or not reporting financing to be a major or severe obstacle. The results remain 
the same even after controlling for a wide range of firm-level as well as country-specific 
covariates. Using instrumental variable techniques to deal with the potential endogeneity of 
trust also leaves the results unchanged. In line with the results of earlier studies, we also find 
that size, obtaining international certificates, capacity utilization and the sectoral origin of firms 
are significantly related to financial outreach. In addition to the firm-level characteristics, 
macroeconomic variables such as GDP per capita, inflation and Rule of Law also explain access to 
finance. However, among the three, only inflation, as a proxy of financial imperfection, remains 
statistically significant in all model specifications employed.   
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: the next section discusses the notion of trust and 
financial access, and explains the conceptual framework of the association between trust and 
access to finance; Section 3 describes the data and empirical methodology used; Section 4 
presents the empirical results of the relationship between trust and financial access; and finally 
Section 5 concludes with policy recommendations.   
 
2. Conceptual and Methodological Framework 
 
A. Concept of Trust  
Theory and empirical evidence point to the important role that a high degree of trust has in 
increasing the number of mutually beneficial business deals. As argued by Arrow (1972), 
virtually all inter-firm transactions require an element of trust, meaning that an absence of trust 
reduces the number of mutually beneficial trades that can take place. With this primary 
argument in mind, in our paper we suggest the level of prepayment demanded by firms from 
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their customers as a measure of (dis)trust. Our suggestion is empirically built on the important 
study by Raiser et al. (2008) where the authors interpreted prepayment as a measure of 
(dis)trust. In order to construct our measure of trust we use the answer to the Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) question, “What percentage of total 
annual sales were paid for before the delivery in last fiscal year?”.    
 
Prepayment as an indicator of trust is a somewhat generalized measure of trust and reflects the 
confidence levels towards every type of private enterprise (e.g. foreign, domestic, small, 
medium and large companies etc.). However, it is narrower than a typical generalized trust 
metric of the World Values Surveys (WVS), which may not provide a good representation of the 
existing moral resources in the business sectors of transitional countries (Raiser et al. 2008). 
Therefore, our measure of trust can also be considered to be a localized indicator, since more a 
generalized trust variable must also capture the level of trust towards individuals, government 
institutions, foreigners etc., which we do not capture in our trust measure.  
In general, we assume that an enterprise will forgo prepayment if it has enough trust in its 
customer(s), either through repeated experience in trading with that/those customer(s), or 
through a recommendation from a third party. Our main assumption is that an enterprise will 
only attempt to acquire prepayment if it doubts that its money will be paid fully and/or on time. 
That is, the higher (lower) the prepayment, the lower (higher) the trust in customers. It is also 
possible that prepayments reflect customer trust in the supplier delivering the goods after 
payment has been received (Raiser et al. 2008).  
As a driving force of inter-firm trust, we cannot avoid the significance of high levels of 
confidence stemming from the efficacy of third party enforcement. The confidence, in a 
situation in which goods which was sold by a firm but was not paid for by the customer, the 
creditor firm is able to appeal to a court to have its credit right enforced.  As an example, a 
supplier may decide to ask for a higher level of prepayment in case of falling into the 
circumstance that third party enforcement would be insufficient. Nevertheless, prepayment as a 
measure of trust can also be problematic. The main difficulty with our measure of trust is that it 
may reflect credit market imperfection, which is common in transitional countries (Bonin et al. 
2005). When suppliers lack working capital, they may ask for prepayments to satisfy their 
demand accordingly. A second problem may arise as a result of the type of goods being sold, 
and demand for prepayments may be more prevalent in some sectors than in others (Raiser et 
al. 2008). A third problem concerns the issue of using trade credits as an alternative measure of 
trust, which can also be complex and problematic.  Given that a detailed discussion of that 
advantages and disadvantages of our trust measure is provided by Raiser et al. (2008), we 
confine ourselves to only a brief discussion of the topic, and conclude that prepayment is a 
powerful proxy for trust. 
 
B. Concept of Access to Finance 
The concept of access to finance has become a popular topic in the recent literature. For 
example, Claessens (2006) defines access to finance as the availability of a supply of financial 
services at reasonable quality and cost.  The terms financial access and financial usage have 
been proposed to be synonymous by Demirguc et al. (2008). Furthermore, Beck and Demirguc 
(2008) suggest that the firm-level metrics of financial outreach provide a more precise way to 
measure access to finance.    
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In our study, we use two measures as proxies for access to finance by firms. The first measure, 
Having a Credit, is a supply-side proxy that shows whether a firm has a loan or line of credit. The 
following question from the BEEPS survey was used to construct the first measure, “At this time, 
does this establishment have a line of credit or a loan from a financial institution?”. The main 
strength of this measure is that it reflects actual access to credits, the main element of financial 
services that are needed, and there is no leeway for firms to provide a wrong or incomplete 
answer. However, the main problem with this measure is that it does not reflect the extent of 
access to finance, since it only allows us to know whether a firm uses a loan or not. As suggested 
by Beck and Demirguc (2008), measures of financial outreach can be either voluntary or non-
voluntary. According to our Having a Credit metric, firms that have access but choose not to use 
services (voluntary absence of finance) are treated in the same way as are those who have no 
access to finance. This leads to partially biased estimates in terms of the general access to 
finance, and therefore we also propose an alternative measure of access to finance.    
The second measure, Financing Obstacle, is a demand-side proxy and reflects a firm’s 
perceptions regarding the degree of difficulty of accessing external finance. To construct our 
second measure of financial access, we use the following question from the BEEPS survey: “How 
problematic is financing for the operation and growth of your business?”. Despite its broader 
definition when compared to the Having a Credit question, using perception-based measures 
can be also problematic. Since our measure comprises of unaudited self-reporting of financing 
obstacle, it is possible that while firms report financing obstacles, they are actually not 
constrained by them. However, there is empirical evidence showing that many of these 
obstacles are related to the growth rates of firms (Beck et al. 2005). 
C. How Does Trust Affect Access to Finance? 
Using the inter-firm trust indicator, we assume that in countries where trust is generally high, 
the supply of financial services would be enhanced. Conversely, in areas where trust is very low, 
moral hazard problems associated with financing may be relatively high for lending businesses 
to develop. Below, we will elaborate on the ways in which high levels of trust in business 
transactions may improve firms’ access to financial services.   
As discussed by Guiso et al. (2004), a financial contract is ultimately a trust-intensive contract. In 
addition to the legal enforceability of contracts, the extent to which the lender trusts the 
borrower can also affect the use and availability of financial services in a country. If, for 
example, creditors doubt that borrowers will be willing or able to repay their debts, fewer 
financial institutions will be willing to extent them their credits. This is true even in 
circumstances where third party enforcement is strong, market-supporting institutions are more 
advanced, and where the opportunistic behavior of borrowers can be avoided by additional 
clauses such as collateral requirements.     
Financial institutions may also consider firms that exhibit high levels of trust in their partners 
and have wide networks to be more successful and trustworthy. As argued by Barr (1998), 
entrepreneurs with larger and more diverse set of networks might have more productive 
enterprises, resulting in the achievement of better credit ratings. The level of trustworthiness 
can be viewed as even greater if a firm’s trusted companies overlap with the financial 
institution’s existing clientele. In this case, the role of an existing member of a financial 
institution can be twofold. First, it can act as a screening device for loans (Varian 1990, and 
Ghatak 1999). This is simply because financial institutions are more likely to rely on relationships 
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with well-known business partners than on more formal mechanisms to make decisions and 
resolve disputes. Second, peer pressure or advice are also essential elements of high levels of 
trust between a financial institution and a new customer since an existing customer would wish 
to preserve its corporate reputation and trustworthiness in front of a financial institution.    
In light of the above-mentioned arguments, we expect that in our study, the trust-intensive 
nature of financial contracts will be even more prevalent because of the transitional country 
context of the study.  The following three reasons may support this idea. 
First, because of weak formal contract enforcement mechanisms, a financial institution would 
be more likely to rely on trust indicators in transitional countries. In transitional countries, 
banking businesses suffer from a number of problems such as asymmetric information, 
insufficient physical collateral, low legal enforcement and ineffective court systems. Empirical 
evidence suggests that in high-income countries, enforcement of contract matters most for 
financial development, while in developing countries information infrastructure is more critical 
(Djankov et al. 2007). Hence, as a strong substitute for formal contract enforcement 
mechanisms, we can assume that trust would strongly and positively associate with access to 
financial services in transitional countries.  
Secondly, in general, transitional countries experience lower levels of generalized trust which 
allows them to benefit from localized trust in their formal financial sector development. Low 
levels of trust toward others are generally associated with high levels of trust within subgroups 
such as family, friends and coworkers (Fukuyama 1995). For this reason, we would expect that 
the likelihood of better access to external finance will be larger in the countries with high levels 
of inter-firm trust.   
Thirdly, the extent to which a financial contract requires trust should also depend on the level of 
education in the transitional countries, where the environment is plagued by relatively weak 
human capital. Low levels of education impede the degree of sophistication of investors, which 
in turn will require greater levels of trust to make the same investment (Guiso et al. 2004). 
Hence, we expect financial institutions in transitional countries to rely more on trust as a 
substitute for their relatively weak level of competency and experience.           
D. Reverse Causality: Does Financial Outreach Influence Trust? 
It is worth noting that simultaneity may be a potential problem in our study as it is possible that 
firms can afford to be more trusting in countries where access to finance is growing. A more 
developed financial system may improve the trust of firms which may be encouraged to 
intermediate or function financially. Furthermore, better access to financial services may 
encourage firms to expand their business and hereafter, develop higher trust towards clients in 
order to keep their business growing. Financial deepening can increase incentives for firms to 
incorporate (Demirguc et al. 2006). All these arguments might suggest that our generalized trust 
measure might be an endogenous variable, which would render rather biased estimates.  
Controlling for such simultaneity bias, we use instrumental variables (IV) procedure which 
requires finding instruments that are both correlated with trust (good instruments), but which 
have no independent correlation with the dependent variable (valid instruments). To find the 
best instruments for trust, we follow both Alesina and Ferrare (2000) and Calderon et al. (2002), 
and use cultural diversity and crime variables that associate with inter-firm trust, but may not 
have a direct effect on access to finance. The Soviet dummy as a proxy for cultural diversity is 
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justified by the notion that transitional countries that used to be part of the Post-Soviet Union 
might share cultural traits and a historical heritage that would have an effect on the level of 
trust in those countries, and which may be different from other transitional economies. The 
Crime variable is proposed to capture the level of insecurity of business in terms of crime, theft 
and disorder, with the assumption that enterprises that face more criminal activity and theft 
may begin from a baseline of a lower level of trust in others.  
3. Data and Empirical Specification 
 
A. Data 
In our paper we utilize the dataset of the Business Environment and Enterprise Survey (BEEPS) 
IV, which is a joint initiative of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
and the World Bank Group (the World Bank). The survey was conducted in 2009 and collects 
data from 11,500 enterprises operating in the manufacturing and service sectors in 29 
transitional countries from Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States  
(including Mongolia) 3. Turkey was also included in the survey for comparison purposes. Table 
A.1 in the appendix reports the number of firms surveyed from each country. 
 
The Survey uses standardized survey instruments and a uniform sampling methodology with the 
following objectives: 
 
(a) To provide statistically significant business environment indicators that are 
comparable across all of the world’s economies;  
(b) To assess the constraints to private sector growth and enterprise performance;  
(c) To build a panel of establishment-level data that will make it possible to track 
changes in the business environment over time, and  
(d) To stimulate policy dialogue on the business environment and to help shape the 
agenda for reform.  
 
There are three levels of stratification: industry, size and region. The survey universe was 
defined as ‘private business establishments with at least five full-time employees’. Government 
departments including military, police, education, health and similar activities were excluded, as 
were those in primary industries including agriculture, mining, etc.  
 
The structure of the BEEPS IV questionnaire consists of three modules. First, the basic 
questionnaire, the Core Module, includes all common questions asked to all establishments 
from all sectors (manufacturing, services and IT). The second expanded variation, the 
Manufacturing Questionnaire, is built upon the Core Module and adds some specific questions 
relevant to the sector. The third expanded variation, the Services Module, is also built upon the 
Core Module and adds to the core specific questions relevant to either retail or Information 
Technology (IT).  
In general, the BEEPS IV covers topics such as firm characteristics (i.e. firm’s age, size, owner, 
legal status), access to infrastructure (i.e. electricity, transportation, water), government 
                                                          
3
 Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia & Montenegro, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan   
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relations (i.e. regulations, tax administration, corruption, construction permits), labor (i.e. 
number of temporary employees, permanent jobs), firm performance (i.e. capacity utilization, 
sales, export), access to finance (i.e. saving accounts, sources of investment financing), and 
business obstacles (i.e. ranking the 15 most important obstacles to business). 
 
In general, several academic papers and policy documents have been produced using the BEEPS 
data base as a very good source for across-country and across-time analysis. A detailed list of 
papers that has used the BEEPS IV database can be obtained from the World Bank’s enterprise 
surveys web site at www.enterprisesurveys.org.      
 
In addition to the BEEPS IV micro data, we also include country-level information on the macro 
and institutional variables that might affect the degree of access to finance by firms.  
 
B. Empirical Specification 
The main objective of our study is to evaluate how trust affects access to finance among firms in 
transitional countries. To do this, we model the financial outreach of firm. We use two proxies 
that have been employed as outcome variables measuring access to finance. Both of them are 
dummy variables reflecting actual, as well perceptional, aspects of access to finance.  
The first dependent variable, Having a Credit, indicates whether a firm has a credit or line of 
finance in the fiscal year surveyed. The following question on the BEEPS IV dataset was used to 
construct this dependent variable, “At this time, does this establishment have a line of credit or 
a loan from a financial institution.” The variable is a dummy variable and answers consist of 
either 0 (no) or 1 (yes).  
The second variable, Financing Obstacle, is a subjective variable and reflects a firm’s perceptions 
regarding the degree of difficulty of having an access to external finance. In order to construct 
our dummy variable for financing obstacles, we use the following question from the survey: 
“How problematic is financing for the operation and growth of your business?”. Answers vary 
between 0 (no obstacle), 1 (minor obstacle), 2 (moderate obstacle), 3 (major obstacle), and 4 
(very severe obstacle). Based on these answers, we construct our dependent variable which is a 
new binary variable getting 1 if a firm considers financing as either a major or very severe 
obstacle (answers 3 or 4 to the question), 0 if otherwise (answers 0, 1 or 2 to the question). 
Given that both our outcome variables are binary, we perform our evaluation in two steps. In 
the first step, we use the binominal probit regression model. Here, we include firm-level 
variables first, so as not to overload the specification, and then we add country fixed effects as 
well as country-specific covariates. Second, we address the possible existence of reverse 
causality between trust and financial access using the instrumental variables method bivariate 
probit model.  
In general, we assume that a firm’s underlying response can be described by the following 
equation: 
                                      
                                                    
where  
    - underlying probability that firm   in country k, has access to financing. 
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       - is the vector of firm-level independent variables.  
       - is the vector of country-specific explanatory variables.  
    - is the measure of inter-firm trust. 
  – is a disturbance parameter, and it is assumed that the parameter has normal distribution.  
As a main independent variable, we construct our trust variable, Average Trust, using the 
answers to the BEEPS IV question on “What percentage of total annual sales were paid for 
before the delivery in the last fiscal year?”. We calculate the average opposite value of this 
statement for each country and use it as our explanatory variable for trust. As such, our country-
level trust scores indicate the percentage of firms, on average, that trust in their customers.4 
To study the determinants of a firm’s access to finance, we proceed in three steps. First, as has 
been done in previous studies, we use a wide set of firm-level controls (Beck et al. 2005). We 
expect a firm’s access to finance to be related to its size, age, export status, sectoral origin, 
capacity utilization, ownership status and external auditing experience. Second, controlling for 
country fixed effects is also important because certain countries may be more prone to 
reporting better access to finance. Therefore, we do not want to bias our results if our 
regressors systematically co-varies with this episode of more intensive reporting of financial 
development, and therefore prefer to include country dummies. Third, we also include several 
country-level variables in our analysis. We use GDP per capita, inflation and Rule of Law to 
measure overall economic development, financial perfection and legal system efficiency, 
respectively. Table A.2 in the appendix reports the sources and definitions of the country-level 
dataset, along with the actual interview questions. 
 
Finally, as explained above, we use equation (1) as the baseline to address the possible 
existence of reverse causality between trust and financial access. In this regard, we employ two 
additional indicators to instrument our trust variable. The first is Soviet, a dummy which gets 1 if 
a transitional country was a member of Post-Soviet Union, and otherwise it gets 0. The second is 
the Crime variable which we construct from the answers to the following question of BEEPS IV: 
“How much of an obstacle are crime, theft and disorder to this establishment?”.  Answers vary 
between 0 (no obstacle), 1 (minor obstacle), 2 (moderate obstacle), 3 (major obstacle), and 4 
(very severe obstacle).  As instrumental variable methods, we employ two different models: (i) 
standard simultaneous equations (2SLS) to perform standard IV tests and (ii) the bivariate probit 
model which explicitly takes into account the binominal nature of the outcome variable (Sajaia 
2006).  
 
4. Empirical Results and Discussions 
 
A. Descriptive Analysis 
In Table 1, we report summary statistics of access to finance indicators for each country. We see 
a large variation in access to finance across countries, ranging from Uzbekistan (16.4) to the 
                                                          
4
 In unreported regressions we also analyzed a firm-level trust variable instead of a country average 
measure. While the results were unchanged in a majority of the specifications, in some cases we found the 
variable statistically insignificant. Since Raiser et al. (2008) also found country-level trust to be a more 
robust metric, we stick to it and report only the results of the aggregated measure.   
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Slovenia (77.5) for the measure of Having a Credit and from Russia (40.2) to the Estonia (6.3) for 
the measure of Financing Obstacles.  
[Table 1 about here] 
In the following two charts, we aim to depict how financial access associates with the average 
trust level in each country. Chart 1 shows that there is substantial variation with regard to 
having a loan among transitional countries, with banked private firms being less common in 
economies with lower inter-firm trust, such as most of the countries in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). Furthermore, having a loan or obtaining a line of credit tends to be 
higher in countries where inter-firm trust is also high. For example, access to credit is apparently 
higher in Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Turkey where inter-firm trust is also prevalent, while CIS 
countries such as Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyz Republic are found to experience 
lower rates of both access to credit and inter-organizational trust.       
[Chart 1 about here] 
In Chart 2 we show the association between inter-firm trust and self-reported financing 
obstacle. A cursory examination of the chart shows that self-reported financing obstacle is lower 
in countries where generalized inter-firm trust is high. Despite some minor differences, the 
results of Chart 2 mirror the outcomes of Chart 1. For example, the majority of CIS countries 
which were found to have both low levels of inter-firm trust and low access to lines of credit 
(e.g. Russia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan) seem to also exercise high levels of self-reported financing 
obstacles. Conversely, fewer firms in the relatively advanced European countries (e.g. Estonia, 
Hungary, Turkey) report that financing is a major or severe obstacle to their growth, and inter-
firm trust in these countries is apparently higher.         
[Chart 2 about here] 
Table 2 reports cross-correlation between our financial access indicators and trust, as well as a 
broad array of firm-level and country-specific indicators. Both Having a Credit and Financial 
Obstacle are correlated with the trust variable. Although this correlation is not that high in 
absolute terms, it appears to be both statistically and economically significant. A firm operating 
in a country with a high level of trust tends to have better access to credit and reports access to 
finance as being a less severe obstacle to its growth.   
[Table 2 about here] 
When examining the correlation between access to finance indicators and firm-level, as well as 
country-specific control variables, we can identify some other interesting findings from Table 2. 
First, all control variables (except foreign ownership) seem to statistically correlate with the 
Having a Credit measure, while some correlations such as size, auditing status and capacity 
utilization were found not to be significant with regard to the measure of Financing Obstacle. In 
terms of Having Credit, some control variables are more strongly correlated with the dependent 
variable than are others. For example, being large, audited and having any international 
certificate are all positively and strongly correlated with Having a Credit.  As far as the Financing 
Obstacle is concerned, having a quality certificate and being owned by foreigners are negatively 
correlated with self-reported financing obstacle, while being older and belonging to the 
manufacturing sector seems to positively correlate with reporting poor access to finance. 
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Finally, according to Table 2 results, we also note that all country-specific variables are 
significantly (statistically and economically) correlated with both proxies of financial access.            
Table 2 also shows that many of the control variables are correlated with each other. For 
example, externally audited as well as export oriented firms tend to be older, larger, and 
foreign-owned, while older firms tend to be larger and involved in manufacturing rather than 
trade and other services. Furthermore, the country-level trust variable is also correlated with 
other aggregated variables, showing that economies with higher levels of inter-firm trust tend to 
have larger GDP per capita, lower inflation and better Rule of Law.  
B. Regression Analysis  
1.  Having a Credit 
In order to investigate the true effect of trust on financial access, together with all firm 
characteristics and country-specific controls that explain our dependent variable, we conduct a 
multivariate analysis. Columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 3 report marginal effects of binominal 
probit estimates for Having a Credits. The reported estimates in Column (1), which display 
marginal effects of firms-level variables on the Having Credits, show that access to credit is 
positively associated with level of trust. After controlling for firm-specific variables, a 1 unit 
increase in country-level trust is associated with a 0.7 percentage point higher probability that 
the firm has a credit from a financial institution. This effect is statistically significant at the 1-
percent level.  
Most control variable coefficients in Column (1) are statistically significant and have the 
expected signs. For example, large size, external auditing status, having international 
certification, being export oriented, higher capacity utilization and sectoral origin are all 
positively associated with access to credit, and all these controls have statistically significant 
coefficients. However, age and sectoral origin of firm appear to be statistically non-significant. 
Finally, being owned largely by foreign individuals or companies is negatively associated with the 
probability of having a credit. This however, may be partially due to foreign-owned enterprises 
having less necessity for borrowing money since they may have more access to internal capital 
resources than do firms that are domestically owned.  
[Table 3 about here] 
Column (2) of Table 3 displays the outcome of the probit models with country fixed effects. 
Here, we include country dummies in the core regression, as specified in Column (1). The results 
show that the positive and significant relationship between social trust and access to banking 
services is highly robust. However, the economic magnitude of this effect is relatively small, 
suggesting that a 1 percent increase in aggregate trust level is associated a 0.15 percentage 
point greater likelihood of a firm having credit. Other covariates remain statistically as well 
economically significant. 
 
In Column (3) of Table 3 we also control for some country-specific variables in order to isolate 
the impact of trust from other aggregate indicators. The magnitude and significance of the 
effect of trust remains the same as in Column (1), suggesting that the probability of having 
credit increases by 0.7 percentage points when country trust increases by 1 percent. Moreover, 
in countries where GDP per capita and Rule of Law is high, firms are more likely to obtain credit. 
Finally, firms operating in countries with high inflation, which we use as a proxy for financial 
imperfection, appear to have lower access to credit.  
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As mentioned, the results of binominal probit estimates of the relationship between aggregate 
trust and access to finance must be interpreted cautiously because of the potential reverse 
causality between these two variables. Column (4) of Table 3 displays the results of the main 
regression equation of the bivariate probit model. We find that trust is strongly related to 
financial access, and the model passes all statistical tests for instrumental variable procedures 
(Sargan’s test for overidentification, the Anderson canonical correlation test for joint 
significance and the Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity)5, meaning that estimating the bivariate 
probit instead of the single equation probit appears to be more appropriate.  
 
In Column (4) the results of the simultaneous equations bivariate probit regression are 
reported in marginal effects. These results suggest that a 1 unit increase in country-level trust 
among businesses increases the probability of having credit by 0.4 percentage points. Between 
firm-level and country-specific variables, the same controls remained statistically as well as 
economically significant, and their magnitudes are very similar to the ones obtained in Column 
(3). The degree of legal enforcement is also positively related to financial access, and this 
association is statistically insignificant.     
 
 
2. Financing Obstacle 
Thus far, we have restricted our regression analysis to the association between aggregate trust 
and Having Credit. However, we know that having credit can only partially reflect the true 
picture regarding firms’ access to finance. As discussed earlier, when a firm has access to (denial 
of) a loan or line of credit from a financial institution it does not necessarily mean that it has 
better (worse) access to finance when compared to a firm with zero (more) borrowing. In this 
regard, we use our second measure of access to finance namely Financing Obstacle, and employ 
the same model specifications used above to estimate the effect of trust on financial outreach. 
As was elaborated above, we expect access to finance to be a less severe obstacle for firms 
operating in countries with higher levels of trust.  
 
In Table 4, we use the four model specifications that we employed in Table 3 and find a striking 
confirmation of our expectations. Column (1) of Table 4 reports the marginal effect of 
aggregated trust on the self-reporting of financing obstacle. Trust has a negative and statistically 
significant impact on the degree of financing obstacle experienced. A one unit increase in inter-
firm trust in a country reduces the probability of a firm’s financing access to be a major or 
severe obstacle by 0.35 percentage points. Among firm-level covariates, age, size, sectoral 
origin, ownership structure and international certification appear to be statistically significant in 
terms of explaining a firm’s reporting on financing obstacles. However, external auditing status, 
capacity utilization and the export orientation of firms are found not to be statistically significant 
in explaining subjective financing obstacles. Among statistically significant covariates, for 
example, older enterprises and firms within manufacturing were more likely to have reported 
access to finance as a severe obstacle than were younger firms and companies operating in 
other sectors. Interestingly, foreign-owned firms seem to report less financing obstacles, which 
                                                          
5
 In addition to the bivariate probit model, we have also run the same bivariate probit model with 2SLS in 
order to perform the standard tests of the IV estimates (the results of the 2SLS model can be provided upon 
the request). 
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runs in contrast to the result we obtained for Having a Credit. This can help justify our argument 
that firms owned by foreigners do not obtain credit as frequently as do domestic firms, largely 
because the former have enough internal investment resources available to them not to need to 
apply for credit.         
[Table 4 about here] 
         
Column (2) of Table 4 reports the estimates of the same binominal probit model with country 
fixed effects. We find that our variable of trust is significantly associated with financing obstacle, 
suggesting that a 1 percent increase in aggregate trust leads to a 0.55 percentage point 
reduction in the probability of a firm self-reporting as financially constrained. The patterns and 
magnitudes of other estimates remained very similar to those obtained in Column (1).    
  
In Column (3) we add the country-level variables and rerun the binominal probit model. We 
confirm the finding that firms in countries with higher trust levels face lower financing obstacles. 
The results also indicate that firms in countries with higher levels of GDP per capita and Rule of 
Law report lower financing obstacles, although the estimates appear statistically insignificant. 
However, the inflation level was found to be positive and significant at the 1 percent level, 
suggesting that enterprises in countries with higher inflation levels are more likely to face higher 
financing obstacles. When we include country-specific variables, the firm-level covariates we 
found to be significant in predicting firms’ financing obstacles continue to be significant with 
one additional variable, namely capacity utilization, becoming significant as well.   
Finally, in Column (4) we provide the marginal effects of the simultaneous equations bivariate 
probit regression for the independent variable Financing Obstacle. As was expected, trust was 
found to be statistically as well as economically significant, even when we instrument our basic 
measure of trust with Soviet and Crime dummies. A one unit increase in aggregated trust 
reduces the probability of financing obstacles for firms by 0.3 percentage points. All other 
control variables have the expected sign and most of them are statistically significant.   
 
 
5. Conclusion  
As suggested by Beck and Demirguc (2008), the agenda on access to finance is still unfinished 
and there is more research needed to identify critical barriers preventing firms from financial 
outreach and inclusion. While supply-side barriers were found to be important in excluding 
some fraction of businesses in transitional countries, cultural impediments such as inter-firm 
trust appear also to be critical in obtaining formal financial services. Provided that formal 
institutions are commodities which are in relatively short supply in transitional economies, our 
results suggest that developing trust among businesses is likely to prove to be a powerful tool 
for expanding access to finance. This is, to our knowledge, the first paper to study inter-firm 
trust and access to finance in the context of transitional countries.    
 
Third party enforcement through mutual trust and networks may be a useful complement to 
enforcement through formal institutions such as courts. The efforts aimed at building trust 
among businesses can prove to be even more important to success in transitional countries 
where legal enforcement is often inadequate. With this conclusion in mind, the question 
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regarding how to eradicate the ultimate causes of distrust among businesses in transitional 
countries becomes one of the key components of reforms towards enhancing financial inclusion. 
 
Our results are also a fruitful avenue for further research on the importance of inter-firm trust 
on economic outcomes. For example, some of the numerous possible topics for future research 
that have been identified include the link between inter-firm trust and a wide range of 
performance metrics including the growth, innovation, profitability etc. of firms. 
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Table 1  
Summary Statistics by Country 
   
 
  Having Credit Financing Obstacle  
 
Country Yes No Yes No 
1 Albania 49.1 50.9 13.1 86.9 
2 Armenia 45.0 55.0 31.2 68.8 
3 Azerbaijan 18.9 81.1 28.2 71.8 
4 Belarus 54.3 45.7 33.5 66.5 
5 Bosnia & Herzegovina 68.5 31.5 26.2 73.8 
6 Bulgaria 44.8 55.2 16.3 83.7 
7 Croatia 70.4 29.6 21.4 78.6 
8 Czech Republic 49.2 50.8 22.7 77.3 
9 Estonia 56.7 43.3 6.3 93.7 
10 Fyr Macedoina 59.5 40.5 24.1 75.9 
11 Georgia 41.3 58.7 33.2 66.8 
12 Hungary 45.2 54.8 9.7 90.3 
13 Kazakhstan 40.7 59.3 30.9 69.1 
14 Kosovo 23.4 76.6 10.4 89.6 
15 Kyrgyz Republic 23.1 76.9 24.8 75.2 
16 Latvia 60.1 39.9 24.4 75.6 
17 Lithuania 59.9 40.1 24.8 75.2 
18 Moldova 46.8 53.2 36.4 63.6 
19 Mongolia 56.6 43.4 34.8 65.2 
20 Montenegro 58.6 41.4 9.5 90.5 
21 Poland 49.5 50.5 22.6 77.4 
22 Romania 53.4 46.6 30.2 69.8 
23 Russia 44.1 55.9 40.2 59.8 
24 Serbia 68.6 31.4 29.4 70.6 
25 Slovak Republic 48.1 51.9 14.6 85.4 
26 Slovenia 77.5 22.5 17.8 82.2 
27 Tajikistan 30.7 69.3 24.2 75.8 
28 Turkey 61.1 38.9 13.8 86.2 
29 Ukraine 33.3 66.7 35.6 64.4 
30 Uzbekistan 16.4 83.6 24.6 75.4 
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HAVING CREDIT 
Chart 1  
Having a credit vs. inter-firm trust in transitional countries 
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Chart 2  
Financing obstacle vs. inter-firm trust in transitional countries 
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Note: The symbols ***, **, * mean that the coefficient is statistically different from zero, respectively, at the 1-, 5-, and 10- percent levels.
    Table 2  
   Cross-correlation 
             
  
Having 
Credit 
Financing 
Obstacle Trust Age Small Medium 
Manufac 
turing Trade 
External 
Audit Certificate 
Foreign 
Owner 
Capacity  
Utilization 
Export 
Status GDP p.c. Inflation 
Rule 
of 
Law 
                 Having  
Credit 1 
               Financing 
Obstacle 0.052*** 1 
              Trust 0.196*** -0.12*** 1 
             Age 0.064*** 0.02** 0.018*** 1 
            Small -0.17*** 0.02** -0.004* -0.2*** 1 
           Medium 0.022*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.59*** 1 
          Manufacturing 0.042*** 0.039*** -0.04*** 0.116*** -0.15*** 0.055*** 1 
         Trade -0.03*** -0.01 0.01 -0.08*** 0.142*** -0.05*** -0.64*** 1 
        External Audit 0.166*** -0.01 0.143*** 0.156*** -0.26*** 0.015** 0.065*** -0.06*** 1 
       Certificate 0.117*** -0.05*** 0.194*** 0.114*** -0.24*** 0.009 0.156*** -0.15*** 0.228*** 1 
      Foreign Owner 0.004 -0.04*** 0.065*** -0.02*** -0.13*** -0.03*** 0.012 -0.04*** 0.136*** 0.156*** 1 
     Capacity 
Utilization 0.054*** 0.012 -0.02* 0.091*** -0.11*** 0.02*** 0.637*** -0.41*** 0.064*** 0.153*** 0.048*** 1 
    Export Status 0.091*** -0.02** 0.148*** 0.035*** -0.15*** -0.01 0.162*** -0.16*** 0.108*** 0.151*** 0.188*** 0.212*** 1 
   GDP p.c. 0.168*** -0.06*** 0.51*** 0.053*** -0.05*** 0.01 0.064*** -0.05*** 0.111*** 0.182*** 0.035*** 0.093*** 0.094*** 1 
  Inflation -0.15*** 0.105*** -0.64*** -0.003 -0.01 0.016 0.083*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.16*** -0.07*** 0.044*** -0.09*** -0.61*** 1 
 Rule of Law 0.155*** -0.11*** 0.828*** -0.01 -0.03*** -0.004 -0.06*** 0.031*** 0.125*** 0.169*** 0.074*** -0.04*** 0.138*** 0.578*** -0.65*** 1 
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Table 3  
Effect of Trust on Having Credit 
 
Having Credit 
 
I II III IV 
 
  
 Trust  0.0070*** 0.0151*** 0.0070*** 0.0039*** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0016) (0.0007) (0.0033) 
Firm-level variables 
 Age   0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0008) 
Small  -0.2168*** -0.2282*** -0.2119*** -0.2055*** 
 
(0.0132) (0.0135) (0.0137) (0.0367) 
Medium  -0.1051*** -0.1134*** -0.1087*** -0.1048*** 
 
(0.0130) (0.0132) (0.0135) (0.0346) 
Manufacturing -0.0030 -0.0023 0.0124 0.0119 
 
(0.0148) (0.0152) (0.0157) (0.0395) 
Trade 0.0247* 0.0257* 0.0318* 0.0306** 
 
(0.0143) (0.0146) (0.0152) (0.0381) 
External audit 0.0883*** 0.0882*** 0.0983*** 0.1028*** 
 
(0.0102) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0275) 
Certificate 0.0227* 0.0250** 0.0129 0.0174 
 
(0.0119) (0.0123) (0.0125) (0.0316) 
Foreign owner -0.0014*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0005) 
Capacity utilization 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0003** 0.0003*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) 
Export status  0.0468*** 0.0373** 0.0585*** 0.0638*** 
 
(0.0177) (0.0181) (0.0188) (0.0474) 
Country-level variables 
 GDP p.c. 
  
0.0442*** 0.0426*** 
   
(0.0076) (0.0191) 
Inflation 
  
-0.0061*** -0.0082*** 
   
(0.0019) (0.0052) 
Rule of Law 
  
-0.0691*** -0.0259 
   
(0.0134) (0.0535) 
Pseudo R2 0.0682 0.0977 0.0699 - 
Obs. 11500 11500 10507 10507 
 
Notes: The symbols ***, **, * mean that the coefficient is statistically different from zero, 
respectively at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent levels.  
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Table 4  
Effect of Trust on Financing Obstacle 
  
 
Financing Obstacle 
 
I II III IV 
Trust  -0.0034*** -0.0055*** -0.0025*** -0.0030*** 
 
(0.0003) (0.0015) (0.0006) (0.0037) 
Firm-level variables 
    
     Age   0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006** 0.0006** 
 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0009) 
Small  0.0205* 0.0255*** 0.0224* 0.0234* 
 
(0.0118) (0.0120) (0.0124) (0.0386) 
Medium  0.0031 0.0051 0.0034 0.0040 
 
(0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0119) (0.0369) 
Manufacturing 0.0530*** 0.0478*** 0.0527*** 0.0526*** 
 
(0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0133) (0.0419) 
Trade 0.0210* 0.0135 0.0179 0.0177 
 
(0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0134) (0.0409) 
External audit 0.0119 0.0135 0.0049 0.0057 
 
(0.0088) (0.0092) (0.0093) (0.0294) 
Certificate -0.0271*** -0.0179* -0.0258** -0.0251** 
 
(0.0100) (0.0103) (0.0106) (0.0341) 
Foreign owner -0.0006*** -0.0007*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0006) 
Capacity utilization -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003* -0.0003* 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) 
Export status  0.0010 0.0169 -0.0018 -0.0009 
 
(0.0153) (0.0159) (0.0164) (0.0513) 
Country-level variables 
   GDP p.c. 
  
0.0073 0.0071 
   
(0.0062) (0.0194) 
Inflation 
  
0.0044*** 0.0041** 
   
(0.0016) (0.0055) 
Rule of Law 
  
-0.0162 -0.0093 
   
(0.0118) (0.0592) 
Pseudo R2 0.0160 0.0460 0.0199 - 
Obs. 11500 11500 10507 10507 
 
Notes: The symbols ***, **, * mean that the coefficient is statistically different from zero, 
respectively at the 1-, 5-, and 10- percent levels.  
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Appendix 
Table A.1  
Country samples 
 
Country Observation 
1 Albania 175 
2 Armenia 369 
3 Azerbaijan 380 
4 Belarus 254 
5 Bosnia & Herzegovina 359 
6 Bulgaria 288 
7 Croatia 159 
8 Czech Republic 238 
9 Estonia 270 
10 Fyr Macedoina 365 
11 Georgia 368 
12 Hungary 290 
13 Kazakhstan 543 
14 Kosovo 269 
15 Kyrgyz Republic 234 
16 Latvia 271 
17 Lithuania 274 
18 Moldova 363 
19 Mongolia 362 
20 Montenegro 116 
21 Poland 434 
22 Romania 506 
23 Russia 995 
24 Serbia 388 
25 Slovak Republic 268 
26 Slovenia 276 
27 Tajikistan 355 
28 Turkey 1,134 
29 Ukraine 831 
30 Uzbekistan 366 
 
Total 11500 
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                                           Appendix 
 
Table A.2  
Variable Description and Data Sources  
   Variable  Description   Source Year 
Firm-level variables 
Having Credit 
Dummy variable is equal to 1 if firm has a loan or line of 
credit, otherwise 0  
BEEPS 2009 
Financing Obstacle 
Dummy is equal to 1 if financing constraint is cited as 
“moderate” or “major obstacle”, otherwise 0.   
BEEPS 2009 
Trust 
Percentage of total sales for which firms are not paid in 
advance of delivery (country average)  
BEEPS 2009 
Age Number of years since establishment began operations 
 
BEEPS 2009 
Small 
Dummy variable is equal 1 if the business employs less 20 
people, otherwise 0.  
BEEPS 2009 
Medium 
Dummy variable is equal to 1 if the business employs more 
than 20 and less than 100 people, otherwise 0.  
BEEPS 2009 
Manufacturing 
Dummy variable is equal to 1 if firm is in the manufacturing 
industry, otherwise 0.  
BEEPS 2009 
Trade 
Dummy variable is equal to 1 if firm is in the retail trade 
and services industry, otherwise 0.  
BEEPS 2009 
External audit 
Dummy variable  is equal to 1 if financial statements of firm 
checked & certified by external auditor in last fiscal year, 
otherwise 0. 
 
BEEPS 2009 
Certificate 
Dummy variable is equal to 1 if firm has internationally 
recognized quality certification, otherwise 0.  
BEEPS 2009 
Foreign Ownership 
Percentage of firm owned by private foreign individual, 
companies or organizations.  
BEEPS 2009 
Capacity Utilization 
Percentage of capacity utilization of establishment in the 
last year.  
BEEPS 2009 
Export status 
Dummy is equal to 1 if over 50 percent of firm’s products & 
services were export sales, otherwise 0.  
BEEPS 2009 
     
Country-level variables 
 
GDP per capita GDP per capita in USD per year (Log)   EBRD 2008 
Inflation Increase of consumer prices (annual average) 
 
EBRD 2006-08 
Rule of Law Rule of Law Index 
 
WGI 2006-08 
 
